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The concept of post-secularism has come to signify a renewed attention to the role of religion within
secular, democratic public spheres. Central to the project of post-secularism is the integration of religious
ways of being within a public arena shared by others who may practice different faiths, practice the same
faith differently, or be non-religious in outlook. As a secular state within which Sunni Islam has played an
increasingly public role, Turkey is a prime site for studying new conﬁgurations of religion, politics, and
public life. Our 2013 research with devout Sunni Muslim women in Istanbul demonstrates how the big
questions of post-secularism and the problem of pluralism are posed and navigated within the quotidian
geographies of homes, neighborhoods, and city spaces. Women grapple with the demands of a pluralistic
public sphere on their own terms and in ways that traverse and call into question the distinction be-
tween public and private spaces. While mutual respect mediates relations with diverse others, women
often ﬁnd themselves up against the limits of respect, both in their intimate relations with Alevi friends
and neighbors, and in the anonymous spaces of the city where they sometimes ﬁnd themselves subject
to secular hostility. The gendered moral order of public space that positions devout headscarf-wearing
women in a particular way within diverse city spaces where others may be consuming alcohol or
wearing revealing clothing further complicates the problem of pluralism in the city. We conclude that
one does not perhaps arrive at post-secularism so much as struggle with its demands.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).The political role of religion has emerged as one of the most
urgent philosophical and practical questions of our time (Berger,
1999; Casanova, 1994; Gorski, Kim, Torpey, & VonAntwerpen,
2012; de Vries & Sullivan, 2006). One of the buzzwords of an up-
surge of attention to the role of religion in politics has been post-
secularism. Post-secularism refers primarily to European contexts
where religion is playing a renewed role in pluralistic public
spheres (Habermas, 2008). Yet the term has also been applied
beyond Western Europe, and recently scholars have begun grap-
pling with the implications of the post-secular in Turkey as well
(G€ole, 2012; K€omeçoglu, 2012; Rosati, 2012; Walton, 2013). An
institutionally secular, democratic state inwhich religious lifestyles
have been ascendant within the public sphere in the past decade,
Turkey has been governed since 2002 by a political party (the
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP, or Justice and Development Party): þ1 859 257 6277.
€okarıksel), ajseco2@uky.edu
Ltd. This is an open access article uthat has disavowed its roots in Islamist politics but has effectively
combined Islamic values with neoliberal economic policies.
Because of the seeming success of this accommodation, when
popular uprisings rocked the Arab world in spring of 2011, many
observers suggested that Turkey might be a model for the new
Middle East (Tait, 2011). But is the Turkish model destined to
ﬂounder on the problem of how religious and non-religious ways of
life can accommodate one another in a pluralistic public sphere?
Key to Habermas' idea of post-secularism is the integration of
religious ways of being within a public arena shared by others who
may practice different faiths, practice the same faith differently, or
be non-religious in outlook. Yet the problem of pluralism has
proven to be a thorny one, not only Europe (see Cesari, 2005;
Ehrkamp, 2010, 2012; Gale, 2005; Hancock, 2008) but in the
Middle East as well (Muashar, 2014).
Despite the importance that religion is theoretically accorded in
politics today, few studies attempt to bridge the gap between the
transformations of secularism and religion writ large and the daily
practices and ordinary discourses through which these are
dynamically and spatially constituted. Indeed, Michele Dillon (2012:nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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post-secular is an appreciation of “how religion manifests and
matters in everyday life.” Approaching the problem of post-
secularism and the practice of pluralism from the perspective of
devout Sunni women in Istanbul, our study performs a feminist
geopolitics of religion, both attending to the “mundane every-day
practices of … religions in relation to politics” (Agnew, 2006,
2010: 44), and the “materialities of everyday life as they constitute
the substantive foundations e the bodies, the subjectivities, the
practices and discourses e of constantly unfolding geopolitical
tensions and conﬂicts” (Dixon & Marston, 2011: 446; see also
Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2001, 2004; Fluri, 2009). This
nexus between religion and feminist geopolitics is a fertile one. Just
as feminist geopolitics has relocated the political within practices of
everyday life, a revitalized geography of religion has moved beyond
the ‘ofﬁcially sacred’ to include previously under-examined spaces
and scales of religion and religious identities (G€okarıksel, 2009;
Holloway, 2006; Hopkins, 2009; Hopkins et al., 2013; Kong, 2001,
2010; Morin and Guelke 2007; Olson, 2006; Olson & Silvey, 2006;
Silvey, 2007). One of the concerns of this scholarship has been to
show how religion interacts with the secular and the political in
public space and how these categories might be questioned
(Ehrkamp, 2010; Howe, 2009; Tse, 2013; Wilford, 2012). Tracing
globally signiﬁcant questions of religion and public life through the
quotidian practices of devout, headscarf-wearing women in Istan-
bul, our research thus takes root within the space opened up by
feminist geopolitics and new geographies of religion. Such a
grounded approach hasmuch to contribute to broad debates (which
have too often remained theoretical, bound up with ofﬁcial politics
and religion, and Eurocentric) about how religious ways of being
interact within and are constitutive of public life in different
contexts.
This paper draws upon research with headscarf-wearing women
who identify themselves as moderately to very devout (dindar)2 to
provide a ﬁrst step towards a broader understanding of the recon-
ﬁguration of religion and secularism in Turkey. Our choice to focus
here on those who identify as devout Sunni Muslim is based in the
particular importance of this sector for the reconﬁguration of Islam
and Turkey's public sphere over the course of the past two decades
(G€ole, 2002; Gümüs¸çü, 2010; Navaro-Yashin, 2002; White, 1999).3
According to a 2006 nationally representative survey, approxi-
mately 60% of the Turkish population identiﬁes as very or extremely
devout (Çarkoglu & Toprak, 2007). Amongst those who do not
identify as devout Sunni Muslims will be Alevis,4 non-Muslims, the
non-practicing, or the non-religious. As a group, headscarf-wearing
women have been negatively affected by state-imposed restrictions
on personal freedom and religious belief, and have actively and
publicly resisted these restrictions (G€ole, 2003; Kavakci Islam, 2010;
Secor, 2002, 2005; S¸is¸man, 1998). Headscarf-wearing women are
therefore an important constituency with whom to discuss en-
counters with difference in urban spaces. Thus with the goal of
opening new perspectives on the signiﬁcance of post-secularism for
the case of Turkey, we conducted four focus groups in Istanbul with
headscarf-wearing (‘covered’ in Turkish parlance) womenwho self-
identiﬁed as devout Sunni Muslims in July 2013.5 A total of thirty-
nine women participated in focus groups, which we grouped ac-
cording to age (below 30 or above) and socioeconomic status
(working class or middle/upper-middle class). Of course, Istanbul is
a very particular Turkish city. Embedded as they are in the fabric of
everyday life in the city, our ﬁndings e much as we feel that they
speak to larger questions about the role of religion in as constitutive
of a spatially variegated ‘public’ sphere e are also particular to this
context. As a small slice of a much larger picture, the research pre-
sented here is preliminary to a multi-method, nation-wide project
on religion in public life in Turkey.6Turkey is a prime context for studying the new conﬁgurations of
religion, politics, and public life that mark our current era. While
critical attention to secularism may provide a fresh viewpoint on
Western Europe and the U.S., the topic has no less than dominated
Turkish studies since the second part of the 20th century (Kuru &
Stepan, 2012; Mardin, 1981, 2006, 2011; Navaro-Yashin, 2002;
€Ozyürek, 2006; Tarhanlı, 1993; Yavuz, 2009). The Turkish mode of
“strong secularism,” inwhich the constitution both removes religion
from the public sphere and gives the state control of religious ac-
tivities, is similar to French laicism in its emphasis on the protection
of the political process from the inﬂuence of religion (Berkes, 1964).
At the time of the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, this
meant not only pushing religion into a newly designated ‘private
sphere’ (Çınar, 2005), but extending the arm of the state to the
administration of mosques and the training of religious personnel
through the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). Further, all reli-
gious activities that did not fall under the control of the DRA, such as
Suﬁ sects, brotherhoods (tarikats), and religious schools (medrese),
were outlawed. Yet with Turkey's transition to democracy in
1945e1950, religion quickly found its way into the populist strate-
gies of party politics. Since the 1980s, many have considered religion
and secularism to be a primary political division in Turkish politics
(Kaya, 2012; Keyman, 2007). In fact, this way of parsing society has
become so overworked that more visionary scholars have called for
moving beyond the secular/religious dichotomy to fresh un-
derstandings of Turkish society (Kandiyoti, 2012; G€ole, 2012). This
call is not only academic; the redeﬁnition of the secular is also a
political project for the AKP. In October 2010, a member of the AKP
charged with drafting the new constitution was quoted in domestic
and international media stating, “We respect Turkey's principles of
secularism, but these need to be re-interpreted” (HaberTürk, 2010).
As the devout Sunni political and economic elite has begun to
reshape politics and public life in Turkey, questions remain
regarding the extent to which difference and pluralism are
accommodated in the evolving of public sphere. Our purpose is to
take the problematic of post-secularism beyond an analysis of
institutional politics and the ideology of the ruling elite. We begin
by situating the concept of post-secularism and attendant notions
of pluralism and the public sphere within the ﬁeld of their uptake
and critique. Taking post-secularism as a problematic that poses
certain questions, we then turn to our ﬁeldwork to show how these
questions give rise to multiple contingent and embodied solutions
in the lives of devout Sunni women in Istanbul. One of the out-
comes of this analysis is that we can see how the ‘public sphere’ of
engagement and encounter traverses spaces typically coded as
public and private in women's lives. Further, while mutual respect
mediates relations between neighbors, coworkers, friends, and
family, women often ﬁnd themselves up against the limits of
respect, both in their intimate relations with Alevi friends and
neighbors, and in the anonymous spaces of the city where they
sometimes ﬁnd themselves subject to secular hostility. Finally,
further complicating the expression of pluralism in Istanbul, we
argue that the gendered moral order of city spaces creates ambiv-
alence for devout headscarf-wearing women when they enter into
diverse arenas. Building upon geographical approaches to religion
and public space, we thus examine the everyday geopolitics of
post-secularism, not as an objective statement about the world, but
as a problematic that allows us to deconstruct the very categories
upon which it is based.
Post-secularism and the problem of pluralism
The concept of post-secularism, which Habermas (2006, 2008)
uses to describe a heightened awareness of the role of religion in
the public sphere that has come about in response to broader social
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politics), has spurred ongoing debate (Gorski et al., 2012; Mendieta
& Vanantwerpen, 2011; Taylor, 2011; Reder & Schmidt, 2010).
Without doubt, the idea of post-secularism as Habermas formu-
lated it can be faulted for embedding the assumptions of seculari-
zation theory (even as it suggests their failure), for exaggerating the
distance between current conﬁgurations and those of the past, and
for perpetuating a mistaken understanding of the uniqueness and
discrete space of religion (Asad, 2003; Joas, 2008; Reder, 2010;
Taylor, 2011). Yet post-secularism can also be an energizing
concept, one that forces us to recognize the contingency of the
secular and its dependence on a particular delineation of the cat-
egories of ‘politics’ and ‘religion’ e a recognition that critical
scholars such as Talal Asad have been promoting for some time
(Asad, 2003; Scott and Hirschkind, 2006). It is to this end that we
deploy post-secularism in this paper.
Post-secularism, as presented by Habermas, assumes a non-
theocratic state, but one that is different from the secular states of
the past insofar as it is inclusive of religious voices and logics within
the public sphere. But rethinking secularism must go beyond
questions about the form of a state. Just as the concept of citizenship
has come to include aspects of identity and belonging beyond ofﬁ-
cial state membership (Isin & Turner 2002; Staeheli, Ehrkamp,
Leitner, & Nagel, 2012), secularism has been critically resituated as
a problematic that goes beyond the formula for ‘the separation of
church and state’ (Asad, 2003). As Charles Taylor (2011: 36) points
out, an institutional deﬁnition of secularism that focuses on the
relationship between the state and religious establishments is far
too narrow to capture the ethos of secularism, which must be un-
derstood to include the broader question of “the (correct) response
of the democratic state to diversity.” A critical assessment of secu-
larism e and post-secularism e therefore requires looking beyond
the institutionalized relationships between the state and religion to
examine the everyday practices through which religious ways of
being and other moral systems interact within and are constitutive
of pluralistic public spheres.
But what do we mean by pluralism and the public sphere? As
Staeheli and Mitchell (2007) have noted, ‘the public’ is a term that
has multiple spatial and metaphorical meanings. In political phi-
losophy, the question of religion's public role is often linked to the
idea of the public sphere, a term that Habermas uses to refer to a
realm where all citizens of a democracy are free to confer “in an
unrestricted fashion … about matters of general interest”
(Habermas, 1974: 49). In his turn to the post-secular, Habermas
reconsiders his previous position that religious identities and logics
must be checked at the door of a secular, democratic public sphere
(Habermas, 2006, 2008). The absurdity of the premise that reli-
gious, gendered, and other differences could be bracketed for the
functioning of a democratic public sphere is well captured by a
cartoon by Latif Demirci, published in the Turkish daily newspaper,
Hürriyet, on November 10, 2003. In the cartoon, a middle-aged
woman in a headscarf is riding a city bus. She calls out to the
driver, “Sir, let me get off before coming to a public sphere …”
(reprinted in Saktanber, 2006: 29). As Ays¸e Saktanber points out in
her analysis of this cartoon, the idea that the headscarf can only be
worn in the private sphere e an idea embraced until recently in
Turkey in the name of secular democracy e makes no sense, both
because there is no clear-cut geographic distinction between public
and private spheres, and because democratic rights cannot be
realized without access to the public sphere.
As it turns out, rather than being baggage that can be left at
home, identities are themselves constituted (often agonistically)
within the very public sphere fromwhich Habermas projected their
exclusion (Mouffe, 1996). For example, Kabir Tambar (2010: 675)
has argued that, in the name of pluralism, Alevis in Turkey have feltpressure to adopt particular modalities of public presence,
participating in an “aesthetics of visibility” (such as public perfor-
mances of rituals that are both festive and worshipful) that some-
times comes into conﬂict with the demands of communal worship
and religious ritual. Thus when we ask questions about attitudes
towards and practices of pluralism in Turkey, we move beyond the
classical sense of pluralism as the competition of interests within a
singular public sphere (with these interests assumed to be tied to
pre-constituted identities) (Benhabib, 2002). Rather, the pluralism
that we examine concerns the interactions between different ways
of being in the world, different moral systems, and different life-
styles that both produce and contest a multiplicity of intersecting
and competing publics. We therefore follow Justin Tse (2013: 2) in
his call for geographers to “reveal spaces, places, and networks as
constituted by grounded theologies, performative practices of
place-making informed by understandings of the transcendent” e
whether those understandings are ‘religious’ or ‘secular.’ In the case
of Istanbul, such spaces are linked both to the metaphorical public
sphere (that is, the arena of societal participation and recognition)
and to actual, variably accessible and contested urban spaces
(Mitchell, 1995). At the same time, our analysis will show how the
embodied practices of encounter and interaction destabilize no-
tions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ space (see also Iveson, 2011).
Given the centrality of pluralism to Habermas' post-secularism,
one might question whether it represents merely an expansion of
liberal tolerance discourse, a concession that religion is now to be
tolerated (if still understood as the ‘other’ of reason and philoso-
phy). If post-secularism is interpreted as no more than the expan-
sion of religious toleration within a secular framework (McLennan,
2010), we will unfortunately miss out on the more radical potential
that inheres in our current conjuncture to break down the ideo-
logical wall between religion and secularism. This is because liberal
tolerance, rather than being a panacea for the challenges of
pluralism, is bound up with the basic premises of the secular state
and its exclusion of religious voices. The common conclusion of
studies of political tolerance that the devout are intolerant (Froese,
Bader, & Smith, 2008; Sheepers, Gijsbers, & Hello, 2002; Yes¸ilada &
Noordjik, 2010) e and therefore presumably intolerable within
liberal democracy e is tautological, an artifact of secularist as-
sumptions that posit liberal tolerance as a virtue available only to
self-regulating, individual subjects and secular states (Brown,
2006: 173). Further, tolerance as a political discourse regularly
and cross-culturally involves “the marking of subjects of tolerance
as inferior, deviant, or marginal vis-a-vis those practicing toler-
ance” at the same time as it whitewashes these exclusions (Brown,
2006: 13). Indeed, Amy Mills' (2010) work in an Istanbul neigh-
borhood demonstrates how a nostalgic discourse of tolerance en-
ables a neighborhood identity to be built upon the disavowal of past
mistreatment of non-Muslim minorities. Likewise, the European
Commission-funded project Accept Pluralism offers little encour-
agement for Turkey, noting that despite a vibrant ofﬁcial discourse
of tolerance, “[T]olerance is nothing but a myth in Turkey …
[functioning] to conceal the mistreatment of ethno-cultural and
religious minorities other than the majority of Sunni-Muslim-
Turks” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2010: 2). In short, discourses of toler-
ance may do more to maintain structures of exclusion and
oppression than to advance the more radical project of rethinking
the secular/religious dichotomy.
Post-secularism for us is not a declaration of a new era or even a
new fracture in the ediﬁce of secularization so long assumed to
describeWestern political development. We do not begin our study
from an assumption that Turkey was purely secular and now it is
not, an assumption that would indeed be difﬁcult to sustain
considering the varied and potent role that both secularism and
religion have played and continue to play in the Turkish polity.
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problems or questions in response to which local, momentary, and
variable solutions continuously emerge. These questions, as we
have traced above, concern how different religious and non-
religious ways of being in the world interact e through what id-
ioms, constituting what kinds of spaces, in conﬂict or cooperatione
within a diverse polity. Like other emergent post-secular geogra-
phies, our project seeks out the potentialities that inhere in a “re-
ﬂexive critique” of the assumptions of secularization (Cloke &
Beaumont, 2013: 44; Beaumont & Baker, 2011). Beginning from
the premise that a democratic public sphere cannot be built on the
exclusion of religious (or other) voices (Habermas, 2008), we move
beyond this starting point to engage with post-secularism as a
problematic that may potentially open up the very categories
(religion, secularism) upon which it is based, thereby dismantling
the justifying discourse of liberal tolerance at the same time as it
thrusts the problem of pluralism to the fore.
Thus it is not the purpose of our study to determine whether
devout Sunni Muslims in Turkey are tolerant or intolerant, tolerable
or intolerable. Instead, we begin from the minimal assumption that
they (like Alevis, those of other faiths, the non-practicing, and the
non-religious) are active players in the socio-spatial organization of
the Turkish polity. Our goal is to provide a fresh perspective on the
dynamics of pluralism by going beyond the measurement of po-
litical tolerance to ask how different religious ways of being interact
with one another and with other moral systems to shape public life
in Turkey. Pluralism, in our study, is therefore not simply a measure
of ‘regulated aversion’ (Brown, 2006) but a question of the speciﬁc
modes and practices throughwhich people coexist and reﬂect upon
that coexistence (for example, through a discourse of respect rather
than tolerance). Our work thus follows upon critical examinations
of the practices and discourses of tolerance and pluralism in Turkey
(Mills, 2010; Tambar, 2010; Walton, 2013) in order to contribute to
“the contemporary reassessment of the pragmatic and philosoph-
ical conditions for pluralist democracy” (Hirschkind, 2008:124).
“There has to be respect”: the demands of pluralism
Insofar as post-secularism poses a set of problems that have the
potential to challenge secularism/religion as a socio-spatial binary,
its various solutions are manifest in emergent formations of reli-
gion and ‘the public’ in everyday life. These formations, moreover,
must necessarily embed within them a solution of some kind to the
problem of pluralism e that is, to the question of how different
religious ways of being are constituted in relation to one another
and to other moral systems within a polity. And taking this argu-
ment one step further, we suggest that this pluralist co-constitution
in turn contributes to particular socio-spatial conﬁguratons, such as
those that demarcate the ‘public sphere,’ its spatiality and its
normative exclusions (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2007). When we bring
these questions to the speciﬁc case of devout Sunni Muslimwomen
in Istanbul, we ﬁnd that their contingent solutions to lived
pluralism traverse the topography of daily life, from the spaces of
home and neighborhood to the shared forums of the city, and in
doing so trouble the socio-spatial delineation of a public sphere.
To explore how the practices and narratives of devout Sunni
women in Istanbul might help us to reﬂect on the problem of
pluralism, we began by posing to them the question of whether
their social environments were diverse e a question that left par-
ticipants to deﬁne diversity as they chose. Women in our focus
groups often responded by specifying the presence of Alevi rela-
tives, friends, neighbors, and colleagues in their social networks.
The discussion frequently expanded to include non-covered (açık,
i.e. no headscarf), non-religious, or non-Muslim people with whom
they had close relations as well. Notably, across all focus groups,women described their social interactions with those whose reli-
gious beliefs or lifestyles are different from their own in terms of
respect (saygı). Mutual respect enabled women to cultivate re-
lationships with those who do not share the same faith or practice
Islam in the same way. Yet women also found that they themselves
were not always treated with respect in what they call ‘secular’
neighborhoods e that is, those generally upper-to upper-middle
class areas of Istanbul where secular lifestyles7 predominate e
despite their often long-term ties to and sense of belonging in such
places. Finally, we ﬁnd that the call for respect, like the discourse of
tolerance, sets expectations of proper conduct that work to regulate
social interactions and to reiterate lines of difference. Respect has
its limits as a principle and practice of pluralism.
The following focus group discussion among young working-
class women in their early thirties illustrates the discourse of
respect and its contested parameters. Following a discussion about
whether one should intervene in a friend's consumption of alcohol
(a practice prohibited by commonly accepted Islamic injunctions),
Remziye argues that one cannot force anyone to behave differently
and asserts the signiﬁcance of respect, deﬁned in religious terms:
“There's respect in religion. There's no insistence that everyone is
going to be a Muslim, everyone is going to follow the rules of Islam.
There has to be respect.” Seher takes this opportunity to describe
her friendships with people “of other faiths,” referring to Alevis. She
lives in the close-knit neighborhood of Sarıyer in Istanbul, which
includes Alevis and Sunnis. For Seher, as long as the person is good
and there is mutual respect, differences in faith do not matter; she
says she talks about everything, “even religion,” with her Alevi
neighbor. Others in the group chime in to claim that they also have
Alevi, non-covered Sunni, and Christian friends and relatives. Selma
explains her close friendships with Christian immigrants from
Macedonia who are in Istanbul working to care for children and the
sick, as well as with non-covered women, some of whom she
considers deeply religious. She positions herself “against people
who are extremely covered and who get mad at a non-covered
young woman passing by. Being a Muslim is not only about
covering your hair.” For Selma respect is key:
Selma: [referring to her Christian friends]. But during Ramadan
… they act as if they're also fasting, just like me. They respect
me. Because they respect me, I also respect them.
Seher: Friendships continue as long as there's mutual respect.
Remziye: My neighbor right across from me is Alevi. According
to our religion, it's not caiz (acceptable) to have neighborly re-
lations [with Alevis]; if one does research about Islamic law,
[one would ﬁnd that] it really is not permissible.
Seher: Even to look into her eyes.
Remziye: But we don't visit each other. We just say hello when
we run into each other on the street. We're not that far apart
[not to say hello] either. They're good people. But we're not
appropriate for them, and they're not appropriate for us in some
ways… For example, I cannot eat the food they cook.
Moderator: Why not?
Remziye: Pardon me but because they don't perform ablutions.
They don't do them. You can't eat even if you wanted to. One or
two times she brought b€orek (ﬂuffy pastries) to my door but you
can't take it. If you take it, you know you can't eat it. Why should
I throw away someone else's food, you ask yourself …
Seher: We eat our neighbors's food. We can't behave disre-
spectfully. Because she treats you well. She eats your food. If you
don't eat hers, then she'll be excluded.
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Seher: If she feels excluded, then she will react to you, because
she eats your food. Then you have to go and eat her food. It may
not be acceptable in our religion, but that doesn't matter if you
break your neighbor's heart.
Remziye: But you don't break her heart.
Berrin: There was a foreign woman where I worked. I was
fasting. She wouldn't eat or drink when I was there. She would
go out to eat and drink. I had speciﬁc hours and left when I was
done. She'd bring her fruit, vegetables, and food and eat then.
Sometimes she'd put food in containers and give it to me for
breaking my fast. She wasn't of my religion but I thank her to
this day. She doesn't have to be of my religion. She was good
inside.
Selma and Seher mix comfortably with their Alevi, non-covered,
or Christian friends and cultivate close relations with them as long
as they are good people and there is mutual respect shown towards
their different beliefs and religions. This respect includes being
aware of different religious obligations, being considerate of the
other person's religious practices, and not tempting or offending
her by, for example, eating in front of her when she is fasting. In
other focus groups, similar examples abound. For example, Perihan,
in the group of older working class women, states that her best
friend is Alevi and she gets alongwith hermuch better thanmost of
her covered friends. Similarly, Aynur in the same group has three
best friends who are all Alevis, and they continue to be friends even
as occasional disagreements arise about religion or politics. The 49-
year-old Hülya explains how her Alevi friend went as far as pur-
chasing a prayer mat for her just so she could comfortably pray in
her friend's housewhenever shewent to visit. This was a sign of the
deep respect her Alevi friend had for her and how shewent to great
lengths to accommodate her religious practice. In the focus group
with older middle-class women, Sevgi, whose uncle is married to
an Alevi, gives details for her intimate relations with her Alevi aunt,
all hinging on mutual respect.
In contrast, Remziye above draws a ﬁrm line against neighborly
relations with Alevis no matter how good they may be as people or
how respectful they may be of her religious orientation. For
Remziye, there are clear religious rules against mixing with Alevis
and it is best to keep them at a distance. Refusing to eat a neigh-
bor's food is disrespectful according to Seher, whose Alevi
neighbors participate in regular neighborhood gatherings where
food is prepared in turns and consumed by everyone attending.
But for Remziye, eating the food prepared by an Alevi is religiously
unacceptable and she sees her refusal of her neighbor's offering of
food as neither disrespectful, exclusionary, nor breaking any
hearts, since it is something that she accepts as a religious obli-
gation and also because she has carefully averted forging any close
relations with her neighbor that may lead to expectations of
sharing food. What Seher understands as showing respect, in this
case, runs against what Remziye perceives as a religious
obligation.
The 40 year-old Eﬁl among older working class women offers
another example of the limits that come into play in women's
relationships:
I had an Alevi neighbor in Gaziosmanpas¸a. I like her a lot and
still see her. One day she came to me and said, “I fast following
your faith, why don't you come to our cemevi [Alevi religious
space]?” I told her that I didn't force her to fast. It's up to you to
fast or not to fast. But I don't want to come to your cemevi. She
was upset. I didn't want to go.Even though Eﬁl's friend respected her Sunni religious practice
so much that she fasted for/with her, Eﬁl didn't reciprocate the
gesture by visiting her friend's cemevi. As Eﬁl explained to the
group that her friendship continued despite a period of pique,
others joined in to state that they have very close Alevi, Russian,
Kurdish, Armenian neighbors, and one countered Eﬁl's refusal by
sharing that she has been to a church. As Aynur (who is 47 years old,
grew up in S¸is¸li, and works as a sales distributor of herbal products)
put it: “When someone is a human being, [religion] really doesn't
matter much. I have a lot of friends who are Russian, Alevi, Arme-
nian, and mixed. We live together as a synthesis and get along very
well.” The 42 year-old Züleyha who grew up in the ethnically and
religiously diverse neighborhood of Beyoglu accused political
leaders of dividing people according to religion and ethnicity. In
contrast, she sees her own experience as inclusive of different
religious and ethnic groups and believes people in general share
similar attitudes. According to her, it is politics that divides people.
Eﬁl's reluctance to visit a cemevi also resonates with a discussion
that took place in another focus group regarding cemevis. The status
of cemevis has been a topic of intense debate in Turkey. Many Alevi
activists have argued for the recognition of cemevis as places of
worship, yet the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) continues to
recognize cemevis only as cultural centers (Es, 2013; K€ose, 2010;
Soner & Toktas¸, 2011). In the focus group with older middle class
women, Ayten (40 years-old) took a position that, similar to the
decision of DRA, questions the legitimacy of cemevis as places of
worship: “I went and saw [a cemevi], I'm a witness. There's no
worship in cemevis. They play the saz [a string instrument], perform
semahs [ritual dancing], turn and turn, then take the dead body and
bury it. What kind of a place of worship is this?” Havva in the same
group objects: “Everyone must live according to her beliefs,” and
Nes¸e supports her by stating that no one, not even the state, should
interfere with the religious practices of Alevis.
Certainly, covered women, as a group, have themselves engaged
in a protracted struggle for both rights and respect in Turkey.
Though Turkey's secular democractic framework has, following 12
years of AKP rule, become more accommodating of devout Sunni
identities, the recognition of religious identities in Turkey remains
frought with deep tensions that not only ﬁnd expression in the
struggles between political parties but also unfold in the neigh-
borhoods and public spaces of the city. In the group of older
middle-class women, Sevgi calls for respect to mediate these
tensions:
Let's say you are açık [non-covered], I am covered. Now if you
respect me, I have to respect you. Essentially the solution is
respect. People need to be respectful of each other's rights and
freedoms. As I said, I live in this way [as a covered woman], the
person who sees me should not look down on me because I live
like this. She should not be disrespectful. She should not tell me
to dress this way instead [of what I'm wearing] and not to wear
that. She can't tell me how to dress just like I can't tell her how to
dress.
Yet despite the increasingly prominent role of covered women
in Turkish society, women in all of our 2013 focus groups com-
plained of being discriminated against and even directly attacked
by anonymous strangers in shared urban spaces. For example,
Semra, who is 32 years old and a housewife with a college degree,
described being put down in the secular middle/upper class
neighborhood of Suadiye in Istanbul when she asked a woman for
directions and was told, “You are covered, I won't engage you to
give you directions. Get out of myway.” Though Semra's story dates
to 2006, when the headscarf ban was still in place and public
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as in 2013, many women shared stories of more recent incidents of
discrimination, from being ignored by salespeople who favor non-
covered customers to more confrontational and even violent public
attacks. For example, Aynur (quoted above) shared her experience
of waving a ﬂag on the street at a public celebration of a national
holiday in the upscale neighborhood of Nis¸antas¸ı where she grew
up when the woman next to her turned and said, “First uncover
your head, then celebrate.” In the group of older working class
women, Ays¸e relates a painful story of her humiliation and confu-
sion on the playground at Bebek, an upscale Istanbul neighborhood,
where a stranger actually struck her and said,“People like you
destroyed Istanbul, destroyed Turkey, you put a scarf on yourself.”
Semra expresses her frustration: “No one sees you as just a normal
citizen who has chosen [the headscarf] for religious reasons.”
Women in our focus groups draw lines of social difference along
religious boundaries with Alevis, non-covered, non-Muslim, and
non-Turkish others. By narrating these interactions in both intimate
and anonymous spaces, women's stories map the city as a con-
tested public-private realm within which they consider respect to
be the key to pluralist coexistence. At the same time as it implies
greater mutuality, respect may simply be a more meaningful term
for our research subjects than tolerance (tolerans in Turkish). In
practice, respect may function not much differently from the
concept of tolerance; like tolerance, the discourse of respect de-
marcates difference at the same time as it mediates social bound-
aries. Mutual respect makes possible the establishment of intimate
relationships with women of other faiths, beliefs, and practices,
even while some women did admit that they were closer to those
whowere similar to themselves: devout, headscarf wearing Sunnis.
Even as they describe and defend their close relationships with
Alevi, Christian, or non-devout individuals, it is clear that differ-
ences did matter. Such boundaries were reinforced by negative
encounters with strangers aggressively attempting to exclude
covered women from the ‘public’ spaces of the city. Thus in some
situations, even respect cannot enable the building of bridges
across differences. Indeed, what counts as respect is not given, but
rather constituted within the particular socio-spatial relationships
of Sunni, Alevi, and secular communities sharing neighborhoods,
workspaces, and public life in Turkey.
“That's a matter of attitude”: the limits of pluralism in public
space
The problem of pluralism is crystallized in the challenge of
sharing of city spaces with those who lead different lifestyles and
live according to different moral systems. Political contestation
over inclusivity, multiculturalism, and plurality often center on the
presence and visibility of religion in shared city spaces such as
streets, parks, or places of consumption and leisure (Herbert, 2003;
Mitchell, 2003; Staeheli, Mitchell,& Nagel, 2009). In Istanbul today,
the most incendiary political conﬂicts often involve questions of
religion and the symbolic dimensions of public space (K€omeçoglu
2012; Tuominen, 2013; Turam, 2013). Such contestation was at
the heart of the 2013 Istanbul Gezi Park protests, sparked by the
planned construction of a neo-Ottoman style shopping mall that
was viewed by protesters and their supporters as emblematic of the
AKP urban projects that have privatized urban space and shaped it
to the tastes of a certain Islamically-oriented, bourgeois segment of
the population (Karaman, 2013). With the emergence of more
spaces that cater mostly to the devout Sunni lifestyle, such as cafes,
restaurants, entertainment spaces, and hotels that don't serve
alcohol (but may draw a mixed crowd with good prices and prime
locations), urban space in Istanbul is under constant renegotiation.
Understanding the micro-geographies of pluralism in Istanbultherefore requires recognizing the varying demographics and cul-
tural characteristics of particular neighborhoods, such as the his-
torically secular upscale neighborhoods of Suadiye, Nis¸antas¸ı, or
Bebek in the above examples. In our focus groups, women dis-
cussed a variety of public spaces in Istanbul where they encounter
non-intimate others. Their narratives uphold an ideal of personal
freedom to live, to dress, and to do as one likes. Yet, at the same
time their discussions also expose the conditions under which
respectful sharing of such spaces might occur and thereby, the
limits of pluralist coexistence.
The serving and consumption of alcohol play an important role
in the sociospatial delineation of the boundaries of pluralism in
Turkey. Despite Islamic injunctions that ban the consumption of
alcohol, the sale, marketing, and consumption of alcohol have been
relatively free in Turkey. In the absence of state regulation, the last
two decades have seen a proliferation of ‘alcohol-free’ entertain-
ment spaces, from cafes and restaurants to hotels and holiday vil-
lages, that explicitly target a devout Muslim clientele. The absence
of alcohol has been an important part of the branding of these new
venues as ‘Islamic.’ Given the rising demand for such spaces among
the devout (indeed, our younger focus group participants desired
more alcohol-free music venues), it is not surprising that public
debate erupted when, in summer 2013, the AKP government
passed legislation restricting the sale and marketing of alcohol.
Whether this legislation was an imposition of a devout Sunni way
of life on the public or was merely an attempt to bring the regu-
lation of alcohol sale and marketing to EU standards was being
widely debated in Turkey at the time of our research. In our focus
groups, most women expressed their support for the 2013 legis-
lation, pointing out that it was really no different from the re-
strictions present in EU countries. Very few saw the new
restrictions as an infringement on personal freedom, and several
voiced their discontent that the new law did not completely ban
alcohol.
The presence of alcohol and its consumption in restaurants,
places of entertainment, and at weddings poses the problem of
pluralism in a particular way for devout, headscarf-wearing women
in Istanbul. While some women had friends or relatives who drank
and themselves did not mind going places where alcohol was being
consumed, for others alcohol consumption was not only forbidden
in itself but being around it was uncomfortable and even fright-
ening. For example, in the group of young middle-class women,
Semra emphasized the signiﬁcance of respect between friends who
lead different lifestyles. The discussion in the group then developed
to show how this respect might or might no carry over to relations
in public spaces of different parts of the city:
Semra: My best friend of ﬁfteen years enjoys drinking [alcoholic
beverages]. When I was single, I used to go with her to Çiçek
Pasajı [a famous historic arcade in Beyoglu that houses taverns];
I used to drink a Coke, she drank rakı [an anise-based alcoholic
drink]. Then I had to carry her back home. But we're still very
good friends; I would never give up my friendship with her …
She doesn't interfere with my life. When it's kandil [Islamic holy
night] she doesn't drink alcohol and comes to pray and worship
with me. I don't chastise her … when she drinks either. She
doesn't try to drawme to her lifestyle and I don't try to impose a
religious way of life on her. She does whatever she wants any-
way; she wanted all kinds of books [about religion] from me,
and I know she read them.
Gülsüm: That's a matter of attitude.
Semra: We are forced to turn against one another.
Sultan: There are also those among us who are very strict.
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servative low-middle income neighborhood] know this very
well, they know it the best. The Fatih of ﬁfteen years ago is not
the same Fatih of today. Fifteen years ago my dress style would
be completely out of place in Fatih but today, I blend in… Fatih
changed a lot…When I was in high school, an old man struck
my friend's legs with a stick because she was wearing shorts…
But no one would do that now …
There's no pressure [anymore]. Look, what does this friend
[Yes¸im] say, “I drink alcohol”; of course she will.
Yes¸im: Who cares? [But] everyone stares at me strangely.
Semra: No one can interfere with your life, that's what I meant.
Yes¸im: But even some waiters say “Ah, you're drinking alcohol”.
…
Sultan: Each person is responsible for her own helal and for her
own haram.
Semra's friendship takes her even to the infamous taverns of
Çiçek Pasajı in the cultural and entertainment district of Beyoglu in
Istanbul, the very location that Yes¸im ewho is the only woman in
our study to say that she herself drinks alcohol e identiﬁes as a
favorite place of hers. Semra accompanies her friend who is not a
devout Sunni Muslim and sits with her as she consumes alcohol.
The 26-year-old Gülsüm's (who has a college degree and works at a
small business) interjects her perception that Semra's attitude is
radical. Gülsüm later describes how she wouldn't feel comfortable
if she had someone drinking at her table even if she did end up
going to a cafe where alcohol is served. Many women in our focus
groups completely avoid places of entertainment (and even wed-
dings) where alcohol is served and consumed. Those women who
go to places where alcohol is served often admit that, like Gülsüm,
while other people drinking around themmay not be an issue, they
would not want alcohol to be consumed at their own table. The
table at which they sit becomes an intimate space that they carve
out as theirs within a larger space that they may not have any
control over. Given the complexity of these negotiations, it becomes
easy to see how the chain of alcohol-free cafes and restaurants run
by the (AKP-governed) Istanbul city and district municipalities of-
fers women a care-free choice.
While Semra's accepting attitude within the bounds of respect
may be radical, Yes¸im is undeniably an outlier amongst our par-
ticipants in that she not only feels comfortable in places where
alcohol is served and consumed, but she herself drinks. She is 33
years old, single, has a college degree and works in an insurance
company where she uncovers her hair to comply with the com-
pany's expectations. She admits to her alcohol consumption very
early on in the focus group and asserts her comfort in doing so. She
presents her consumption of alcohol in terms of her adaptability to
different environmentsdsuch as her place of work, where she
takes off her headscarf, or the upscale Bebek neighborhood where
she lives (the same place where Ays¸e was slapped by a stranger).
However, she repeatedly brings up how she is made to feel un-
comfortable by waiters and by other, drinking patrons of the places
she frequents. She is wary of the scorn of the presumably non-
devout patrons who see her drinking as unacceptable because of
the perceived incongruity between wearing the headscarf and
drinking alcohol. The headscarf signals her commitment to abide
by the Islamic moral code while drinking violates that very code,
thereby presenting a paradox for unlookers, evenwhen Yes¸im does
not understand her behavior as necessarily incongruous with what
her scarf represents. Semra says she similarly attracts attentionfrom the clientele as soon as she steps into a place where alcohol is
served. The scornful stares, the disapproving comments of those
who themselves drink, attempt to discipline headscarf-wearing
women like Semra and Yes¸im and convey the message that the
headscarf and thewomenwhowear it do not belong in such spaces.
At the same time, these women's sense that their religiosity per se
is no barrier to their participation in such spaces and practices
asserts the multiplicity of religious ways of being against the ex-
pectations and even demands of the political metaphysic that at-
tempts to ﬁx the socio-spatial boundaries of both secularism and
Islam in Turkey.
As in Semra's narrative above, dress emerges as an important
indicator of pluralistic coexistence and the degree to which
different lifestyles and moral systems are accommodated in public
space. The opinion that everyone should be able dress as she
pleases predominated among the women but with an important
exception: Extremes were to be avoided, whether it was as¸ırı kapalı
(extreme covering) or as¸ırı açık (extremely revealing clothing
styles). But more than any absolute markers of the limits acceptable
dress (which are indeed difﬁcult to establish, as debates in our
focus groups attest), the question of when sharing pubic spaces
with scantily clad women became a problem hinged not on the
dress itself but on men's responses to it. In the following dialogue
that took place in the group of older middle-class women, Eﬁl re-
sponds to another woman's description of a beautiful young
woman walking on the street wearing a dress so short that her
bottom is showing. She explains:
Eﬁl: It's not her noncoveredness that disturbs me. It's the men
turning around to look at her over and over again …
Zeynep: They [men] also look at covered women.
Eﬁl: I told a man actually. Why are you looking? She could be
your sister. She could be your wife.
Asiye: Now it's not only the noncovered. There are some
covered women who wear skin-tight clothes. Five or six men,
everyone, even I, look at her. It's not only noncovered women.
Covered women do the same. This shouldn't be done …
…
Zeynep: I think there's no extreme on either side. Someonemay
be wearing a çars¸af [full veil] or noncovered. I want everyone to
respect each other. That's what's necessary.
Women's comfortable presence in the street is contingent not
merely on the presence or absence of eye-grabbing women
(whether covered or non-covered), but more directly on what they
perceive as the sexualization of the street's economy of looking and
being seen. Rather than a lack of respect for ‘extremely’ non-
covered women, or even for covered women who wear showy or
tight clothes, what women express is a discomfort with the affec-
tive milieu that arises when men are staring at attractive women;
indeed they feel that they themselves may get caught up in this
looking (G€okarıksel & Secor, 2012, 2014). As this discussion evolves
into a debate about what role education might play in changing the
behavior of men, women come to deﬁne the gender dynamics at
work for the possibility of a pluralist coexistence in public space.
There is more at stake in a short skirt than one might think.
While most women strive to uphold an ideal of individual
freedom and respect for different lifestyles in public spaces, it is
nonetheless apparent that, for many, the diversity of Istanbul's
streets, arcades, and other spaces of leisure and entertainment pose
uncomfortable challenges. The ideal of acceptance and accommo-
dation of secular, non-religious, or differently religious lifestyles
Fig. 1. A sign photographed during the June 2013 Istanbul protests: Freedom for the
Turban and Alcohol. Photo courtesy of Arda Ç.
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sumption or a generally accepted but ambiguous dress code. People
drinking alcohol, men staring at women, and couples making out
were, for many of our respondents, aspects of public life that they
felt that they and their families needed to avoid. The regulation of
such behaviors by private or municipal establishments geared to-
wards the Sunni devout provided welcome relief from these com-
plexities, and fewwomen seemed ready to object if such regulations
became more widespread or topedown, as demonstrated by their
support for the recent alcohol legislation. At the same time, the
sociospatial boundaries ofwhat is acceptable andwhat is not remain
fuzzy: Is it acceptable to go to a wedding where alcohol is served? Is
it OK to sit at a table where others are drinking? Is it OK to use a
clean glass in which alcohol has been served previously? Devout
headscarf-wearing women in Istanbul resolve these dilemmas in a
range of different ways, individually and in relation to their own
circles, contingently and in relation to broader moral principles. The
contested gendered moral orders of public space thus further
complicate the embodied practices of the post-secular.
Conclusion
Like the cartoon inwhich a covered woman asks to be let off the
bus at the threshold of the public sphere (Saktanber, 2006),
women's conversations point to the ambivalent connection be-
tween an abstract public sphere and the actual ambiguously public
spaces of the city that are unevenly accessible to a range of people
and behaviors (Staeheli et al., 2009). The public sphere may be a
metaphorical space of democratic deliberation, but it comes into
being through the daily spaces of people's lives. In neighborhood
spaces shared by Alevi and Sunni neighbors or at celebrations on
the streets where citizens adhering to different religious or moral
systems come together, difference is produced and encountered
across varying levels of intimacy. The geography of pluralism that
can be traced fromwomen's discussions is ultimately one in which
distinctions between public and private spaces and their degree of
linkage to a metaphorical public sphere are not clear-cut. Thus the
big questions of post-secularism regarding how religious ways of
being and other moral systems interact within and are constitutive
of pluralistic public spheres seem to play out both in the anony-
mous spaces of the city, where women navigate a gendered moral
order made taut with the tensions of political and cultural
contestation, and in the intimate micro-geographies of offered
prayer mats, rejected pastries, a visit to the house of an Alevi aunt,
or the refusal to visit a friend's place of worship. Insofar as the
question of how to interact across religious differences becomes
important in shaping the mode of engagement even among rela-
tives, friends, and neighbors who share intimate spaces, the prob-
lem of pluralism e and therefore of post-secularism e cuts across
and ultimately undermines the distinction between so-called
public and private spaces.
The political is thus not entirely ‘public.’ The expectation that it
is or should be is itself rooted in a particular, masculinist vision of
the political (Cope, 2004; Dowler, 1998; Fincher, 2004; Pateman,
1988; Rose, 1993; Sharp, 2007; Staeheli, 1996) and promoted by a
regime of secularism that bolsters a public/private dichotomy by
carving out religion as a speciﬁc ﬁeld (Asad, 2003). Our purpose in
this paper has been to continue the long work of deconstructing
this frame e the one that associates politics, publicity, and the
secular e by approaching the problematic of post-secularism
through an analysis of how Sunni women in Istanbul discuss
their interpersonal relations and their daily decisions regarding
where they can appropriately eat, socialize, or enjoy entertainment.
By showing how the role of religion in a non-theocratic polity is
constituted in and through these quotidian public-private spatialpractices, we aim to advance the recent line of inquiry in Turkey
and beyond that has pried open the category of religion and begun
to examine its multiple and complex interactions with the secular
and the political (Arat, 2005; Holloway & Valins, 2002; Ivakhiv,
2006; Kong, 2002, 2006; Tse 2013; Wilford, 2010).
The post-secularist vision of a polity within which religious
ways of being participate in a pluralistic public life is not realized on
the ground in Turkey; women's stories of being aggressively sanc-
tioned by strangers are enough to conﬁrm this observation, but we
can also turn for conﬁrmation, from another angle, to the ACCEPT
Pluralism study's conclusion that tolerance is but a “myth” in
Turkey for ethnic and religious minorities (Kaya & Harmanyeri,
2010: 2). Yet this is not simply to say that the Turkish polity falls
short (though of course it often does), but rather that post-
secularism embeds ideals that are better understood as ethical
projects towards which a society may strive; one does not, perhaps,
arrive at post-secularism so much as one struggles with its de-
mands e for example, the demand for respect in both intimate and
anonymous relations. Thus rather than the achievement of a new
dispensation wherein the secular and the religious are no longer
deﬁned in their opposition, what we ﬁnd through an examination
of the everyday discourses and practices of devout Sunni women in
Istanbul is a public sphere that is necessarily contested, uneven,
and riven with contradictions and diverse viewpoints. The public
sphere that comes into focus here is restlessly mobile: not conﬁned
to the abstract spaces of media or material public spaces of the city,
but instead knitting together and being made and remade within
and across both anonymous and intimate relations and spaces.
In the summer of 2013, a photograph taken at Taksim circulated
through social media (Fig. 1). It was of a sign propped up against one
of the protestor's barricades, and it read: “Freedom for alcohol and
the türban [headscarf].” Such could be the rallying call of post-
secularism in Turkey, but who will carry this sign? What happens
when accepted religious obligations come into conﬂict with the
ethical demands of pluralistic coexistence, as we saw that they can in
the case of SunnieAlevi relations? Howwill we move forward when
we come to such an impasse?We leave youwith thewisdomof Feliz,
a 43-year-old sales assistant in the group of older middle-class
womenwho has lived in Istanbul all of her life, and an open question:
Feliz: There are a lot of wrongdoings, there really are a lot. There
are some good deeds but wrongdoings too. And what is good in
our view may be wrong according to someone else.
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in our view but wrong in yours …
Feliz:We're going to ﬁnd a middle ground. Because this country
belongs to us all.
Moderator: How are we going to do that?
Feliz: By talking, I think. By debating, talking. Humanely.
Moderator: Do you think we are able to do that?
The conversation then headed in another direction as women
discussed state beneﬁts for those caring for the disabled. The
question remained unanswered.
Endnotes
2 We consider religiosity to be a continuum. Individuals will have different ideas
about what it means to be devout, and people will also consider themselves
differently with regard to this question at different times in their lives and in
different contexts (e.g. one might consider oneself relatively religious in one's social
circles, but not so highly in an environment of religious training). In this study,
research subjects self-identiﬁed themselves as moderately to highly devout Sunni
Muslims without either the researchers or the subjects deﬁning what religiousity
(dindarlik) means to them. This is a question for another paper. In this paper, we
will use ‘devout’ as shorthand for the middle-to-upper-end of the spectrum upon
which our Sunni Muslim subjects identiﬁed themselves.
3 For an interesting comparison, see the work of Binnaz Toprak (2009) on “being
different in Turkey” in which she and a team of researchers interviewed over 400
people (focusing onwomen, Alevis, those with secular identities, young people who
dress in less ordinary ways, leftists, and Kurdish students) across Turkey.
4 Alevis constitute the largest socioreligious minority group in Turkey. The esti-
mates of the Alevi population vary drastically between 10 and 25 million out of a
total of 75 million in Turkey. Roughly two-thirds speak Turkish while the rest speak
Kurdish (Dressler, 2008: 281). Alevism is loosely associated with the Shia branch of
Islam. In Sunni dominated Turkey, Alevis have long been considered heterodox
community. Most Alevis do not follow the ﬁve pillars of Islam; they do not pray ﬁve
times a day, go to pilgrimage to Mecca, or fast during Ramadan (Es, 2013: 25).
Instead, many Alevis participate in cem ceremonies led by Alevi religious leaders
(dedes), fast for 12 days during the month of Muharram, and have their own des-
tinations for pilgrimage.
5 The focus groups took place in a central district of Istanbul near a large shopping
center (in S¸is¸li) with the help of an Istanbul-based research ﬁrm, Sosyal Arastirma
Merkezi. The authors, the focus group moderator, and other female assistants were
not wearing headscarves. This difference from our participants may have affected
the conversations that ensued.
6 This project (principle investigators Gokariksel and Secor) has been funded by the
National Science Foundation, BCS- 1437132/. Title: Collaborative Research: The Role
of Religion in Public Life: Islam in Turkey Today. Duration 8/15/14 to 1/31/17.
7 A ‘secular’ neighborhood may be visually marked by the presence of establish-
ments serving alcohol, businesses open during Friday prayer time, young people
publically displaying affection, and the predominance of women not adhering to
Islamic standards of modest dress. For Istanbulites, certain established high-class
neighborhoods are associated with the dominance of such ‘secular’ lifestyles,
despite the fact that in reality they may be more diverse.References
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